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Abstract
We have conducted an agent-based simulation of chain bankruptcy. The propagation
of credit risk on a network, i.e., chain bankruptcy, is the key to understanding large-
sized bankruptcies. In our model, decrease of revenue by the loss of accounts payable
is modeled by an interaction term, and bankruptcy is defined as a capital deficit.
Model parameters were estimated using financial data for 1,077 listed Japanese
firms. Simulations of chain bankruptcy on the real transaction network consisting
of those 1,077 firms were made with the estimated model parameters. Given an
initial bankrupt firm, a list of chain bankrupt firms was obtained. This model can
be used to detect high-risk links in a transaction network, for the management of
chain bankruptcy.
Key words: Econophysics, Agent-based simulation, Game theory, Firm dynamics,
Complex network, Credit exposure management, Chain bankruptcy
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1 Introduction
A transaction network describes the physical distribution of products. Figure 1
is a small transaction network consisting three agents, A, B, and C. The arrow
indicates physical distribution. The left-hand side is upstream of the physical
distribution. The lower figure shows money flow. Note that the money flow
arrow is in the opposite direction to that of physical distribution. The firm
located upstream of physical distribution in a transaction network has the ac-
counts receivable. On the other hand, the firm located downstream of physical
distribution has the accounts payable. If the downstream firm cannot pay its
accounts payable due to bankruptcy, the upstream firm may also go bankrupt.
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Fig. 1. A small transaction network consisting of three agents, A, B, and C. If the
downstream firm cannot pay its accounts payable due to bankruptcy, the upstream
firm may go bankrupt.
In this study bankruptcy is defined as a capital deficit. This propagation of
credit risk on the transaction network is referred as ”chain bankruptcy”.
An agent-based model of interacting firms, in which interacting firm agents
rationally invest capital and labor in order to maximize payoff, has been de-
veloped and applied to some basic problems [1,2]. This paper describes the
first attempt to apply the agent-based model to chain bankruptcy. Although
credit exposure management is an issue for individual firms [3], management
for chain bankruptcy needs a knowledge of the whole transaction network.
This paper is organized as follows. First, the propagation of credit risk is
described. Then, the agent-based model of chain bankruptcy is explained. Fi-
nally, agent simulations are made for a real transaction network and the results
are discussed.
2 Propagation of Credit Risk
By using bankruptcy data for the last 10 years in Japan [4], it was shown
that chain bankruptcies are by no means negligible [5]. Temporal change of
bankruptcy size is shown in Fig. 2. Figure 2 shows total debt and its ratio to
nominal GDP vs. fiscal year. From this figure, we see that the total debt of
bankrupt firms can be as large as several percent of GDP.
Figure 3 charts the distribution of debt for bankrupt firms. Crosses indicate
bankruptcies due to the poor performance of an individual firm. Dots indicate
bankruptcies due to the network effect, i.e., chain bankruptcy. Both distribu-
tions are characterized by the power law distribution. It should be noted that
the exponent for the distribution of bankruptcies caused by the network effect
is smaller than the distribution of bankruptcies caused by the poor perfor-
mance of individual firms. This means that the chain bankruptcy effect is an
important contributor to large-sized bankruptcies.
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Fig. 2. Temporal change in bankruptcy size. Note that the total debt of bankrupt
firms can be as large as a few percent of GDP.
Fig. 3. The distribution of debt for bankrupt firms. Note that the exponent for the
distribution of bankruptcies due to the network effect is smaller than the distribution
of bankruptcies due to the poor performance of individual firms.
3 Model of Chain Bankruptcy
Revenue R(t) of a ith firm agent is described by the time-evolution equation
[1,2]:
Ri(t+ 1) = Ri(t)
K(G)i (t+ 1)αiL(G)i (t+ 1)βi
Ki(t)αiLi(t)βi
+
∑
j∈Customers
fij + σii
 , (1)
fij = kij
(
Rj(t)
Rj(t− 1) −
G(t)
G(t− 1)
)
. (2)
Here K
(G)
i (t) and L
(G)
i (t) are capital and labor, respectively [6]. Capital is
the sum of tangible fixed assets and depreciation costs, thus capital is mainly
investment in production facilities. On the other hand, labor is the sum of
labor costs and staff costs. The suffix (G) in the first term on the R.H.S. of
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Eq. (1) indicates the solution of the game theory. The second term on the
R.H.S. of Eq. (1) is an interaction term due to transactions. G(t) of Eq. (2) is
gross domestic product. Material cost Ci(t) is calculated using
Ci(t+ 1) = AiK
(G)
i (t+ 1)
αiL
(G)
i (t+ 1)
βi . (3)
The ith firm agent makes investment decisions for capital K
(G)
i (t+1) and labor
L
(G)
i (t+ 1) in order to maximize profit Πi(t+ 1), defined by
Πi(t+ 1) = Ri(t+ 1)− Ci(t+ 1)− riK(G)i (t+ 1)− L(G)i (t+ 1), (4)
under the investment decisions made by the rest of the agents. The agent’s
decision making was modeled using a genetic algorithm [2]. This solution cor-
responds to the Nash equilibrium. Model parameters αi, βi, and kij were em-
pirically estimated as described later.
Figure 4 explains the chain bankruptcy algorithm. Bankruptcy of the kth firm
decreases revenue of the lth firm through the loss of accounts payable. Equity
at the end of term E
(f)
l (t+1) is calculated by adding operating profit to equity
at the beginning of the term:
E
(f)
l (t+ 1) = E
(i)
l (t+ 1) + Πl(t+ 1), (5)
where the second term on the R.H.S. is equity at the beginning of the term.
If equity at the end of the term is less then zero E
(f)
l (t + 1) < 0, the l
th firm
goes bankrupt (capital deficit) and cannot pay its accounts payable to the mth
firm.
On the other hand, if equity at the end of the term is larger then zero E
(f)
l (t+
1) > 0, chain bankruptcy stops at the mth firm, as shown in Fig. 5. This
situation will occur when equity of the lth firm is large, or when the amount
of the transaction (i.e., the strength of interaction kij) is small.
The next step was calibration of the parameters. Parameters were estimated
using financial data for 1,077 listed Japanese firms. Error was given by Eq.
(1),
i
σi
=
1
σ2i
Ri(t+ 1)
Ri(t)
−
(
Ki(t+ 1)
Ki(t)
)αi (Li(t+ 1)
Li(t)
)βi
−∑
j
fij
 . (6)
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Fig. 4. The chain bankruptcy algorithm. If equity at the end of the term is less
then zero E(f)l (t + 1) < 0, the l
th firm goes bankrupt (capital deficit) and cannot
pay its accounts payable to the mth firm.
Fig. 5. If equity at the end of the term is larger then zeroE(f)l (t + 1) > 0, chain
bankruptcy stops at the lth firm. This situation will occur when equity of the lth
firm is large, or when the amount of the transaction (i.e., strength of interaction
kij) is small.
From previous data analysis [7], it is known that the error distribution is
normal. Thus, the likelihood f(R,K,L,GDP |α, β, k) is defined by
f(R,K,L,GDP |α, β, k) = (2piσ2)−T2
T∏
t=1
exp
(
− 
2
i
2σ2i
)
, (7)
and the log-likelihood l(R,K,L,GDP |α, β, k) is written by taking the loga-
rithm of Eq. (7)
l(R,K,L,GDP |α, β, k) = ln(2piσ2)−T2 −
T∑
t=1
2i
2σ2i
. (8)
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Fig. 6. Histograms of obtained parameters. Model parameters were estimated with
financial data using the maximum-likelihood method for 1,077 listed Japanese firms.
Estimation errors were within several percent for most firms.
Here t = 1 to T represent Japanese Fiscal Years (JFY) 1993 to JFY2003.
We minimized the second term of the log-likelihood using the quasi-Newton
method. Figure 6 shows histograms of the obtained parameters Figures 6 (a)
to (d) are frequencies of αi, βi, αi + βi, and kij, respectively. Figure 7 shows
the convergence of the second term of log likelihood for four arbitrarily chosen
firms. Finally, the distribution of average error is shown in Fig. 8. Average
error is calculated from values of the second term of log likelihood. Estimation
errors were within several percent for most firms.
4 Agent Simulations
Chain bankruptcy on a real transaction network, consisting of 1,077 listed
Japanese firms, was simulated with the estimated parameters by creating
bankruptcy at one firm, called the trigger firm. We created simulations for
two cases. The trigger in the first case is firm A, belonging to the electrical
machine industry sector, and the trigger in the second case is firm B, belonging
to the chemical industry sector.
Figure 9 is the chain bankruptcy simulation result triggered by firm A. Bankrupt
firms are indicated by white triangles; firm A is located at the center of this
network. Circles are suppliers of firm A; suppliers separated by many links are
located on the outer circumference. Arrows indicate the flow of money, which
is in the opposite direction to physical distribution. From this simulation, we
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Fig. 7. Convergence of the 2nd term of log likelihood for four arbitrarily chosen
firms.
Fig. 8. Distribution of average error. Estimation errors were within several percent
for most firms.
obtained a list of chain bankrupt firms.
Figure 10 is the chain bankruptcy simulation result triggered by firm B; firm
B is located at the center of this network. In this case, the bankruptcy chain
is extended in one direction only, unlike the first case. Similarly, we obtained
a list of chain bankrupt firms. The number of links is larger than in the first
case, although the number of bankrupt firms is smaller.
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Fig. 9. Simulation result of chain bankruptcy triggered by a firm belonging to the
electrical machine industry sector. Bankrupt firms are indicated by white triangles.
Arrows indicate the flow of money, which is in the opposite direction to physical
distribution.
5 Conclusions
In this project we created agent-based simulations of the chain bankruptcy
process. First, it was shown bankruptcies are an important economic phe-
nomenon. The total debt of bankrupt firms can be as large as a few percent
of GDP. Understanding the propagation of credit risk through a network, i.e.,
chain bankruptcy, is key to understanding large-sized bankruptcies. Second,
an agent model of chain bankruptcy was presented. In this model, decrease of
revenue by the loss of accounts payable was modeled by an interaction term.
Model parameters were estimated with financial data for 1,077 Japanese firms.
Finally, simulations of chain bankruptcy on a real transaction network con-
sisting of 1,077 listed Japanese firms were made with the estimated model
parameters. This agent model will be useful for detecting high-risk links in
the transaction network, for the management of chain bankruptcy.
Briefly, our plans for further study are as follows. The first task concerns the
stochastic simulation of bankruptcy by taking into account the third term
on the R.H.S. of Eq. (1). A default correlation obtained from the stochastic
simulation will be used as input data for Value at Risk simulation [8]. The
second task concerns a generalization of the agent model of chain bankruptcy.
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Fig. 10. Simulation result of chain bankruptcy triggered by a firm belonging to the
chemical industry sector. In this case, the bankruptcy chain is extended in only one
direction, unlike the first case shown in Fig. 9.
The current model focuses on a transaction network of manufacturers. The
generalized model will be applicable to analyzing liquidity risk on a network
of banks [9].
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